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APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO
HOUSING SEGREGATION
DISCRIMiINATORY practices by private parties have compelled the Negro to
compete for a home on unequal terms with the white.' He is faced with sub-
stantial restrictions in both the financing and selling phases of housing. Al-
though purely private actions do not violate any civil liberties guaranty," their
economic effects may bring them within the proscriptions of federal anti-
trust legislation.3 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable
restraints of interstate trade.4 Examination of current discriminatory practices
1. For general discussion of the extent and the effects of housing segregation, see
WEVR, THE NEGRO GHETrO (1948); LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPmT (1947);
AmzIcAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
COLORED PEOPLE, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1953: A BALANCE SI.ExT or'
GROUP RELATIONS 100 et seq. (1954) ; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIrrEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 67-8 (1947); NATIONAL COln!uNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL, EQUALITY
OF OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING (1952); Comment, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57
YALE L.J. 426 (1948); HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, HOUSING OF TIE NON-
WHITE POPULATION 1940 TO 1952).
The problem is particularly acute in urban areas due to the great influx of Negroes
since 1940. The nonwhite population in these areas increased 46 percent in the years 1940
to 1950. This represented a growth of almost 3 million persons. During the same period,
the entire nonwhite population increased by only 15 percent. Id. at 3.
2. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to those
racially discriminatory practices which involve "state action" (i.e. state legislation or
acts done under state authority). Federal civil rights legislation must also be directed
at "state action." Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). Thus, the recent decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
declaring judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants to be unconstitutional, has
no effect on exclusively private action.
3. A recent survey of housing segregation, conducted by the Race Relations Depart-
ment of Fisk University, described the existent situation in this manner: "The effect of
racial policies and practices governing the distribution of housing has been the creation
of a separate Negro housing market as distinguished from the general housing market.
For the most part, Negroes can compete with other Negroes only within the Negro
market, but they are restrained from competition with whites for housing within the
general market." LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PRO'ERTY 56 (1947).
This comment will not deal with state anti-trust legislation since tile statutes have,
for the most part, been inefficacious. In addition, their scope is uncertain because of a
lack of sufficient interpretation. See Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 175-6 (1951).
4. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. . . ." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). This
section has been construed to apply solely to unreasonable or undue restraints. See
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
"The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done
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shows that such unreasonable restraints are often present in refusals to
advance mortgage money for Negro entry into white areas and to sell homes
to Negroes.
REFUSAL To LEND
The lender plays a crucial role in the general housing picture. His influence
extends throughout the entire building process ;t the power to extend or to
withhold credit enables him to influence the volume, place, and type of con-
struction.0 And the purchase of a home usually involves mortgaige financing. 7
The principal lenders in the field of long-term mortgage financing are insur-
ance companies, savings banks, commercial banks, and savings and loan asso-
ciations.8 Other groups, such as real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, and
mortgage companies,' may do a substantial amount of initial lending. Homw-
ever, they quickly transfer their mortgages to large institutional lenderts
which alone have sufficient capital to maintain long-term investments.',
The vast resources of these financial institutions have not been made equally
available for Negro and white housing." Widespread discriminatory practices
by any of these.... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be prctratcd."
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 23, (1948).
5. Few builders have sufficient working capital to engage in construction without
the benefit of mortgage loans. HousixG A-N-D Hoica Fxx.xxcnE AGEN:c,, FiNANC::G HvtFn
CoNsRcroN IN THE NORTHWEST 7 (1951); COLAxN, Anmic.E..N HoVsI:;tV (9, 117
(1944).
6. Id. at 119-20.
7. See notes 114 and 115 infra, and accompanying textL
S. There is no single kind of institution in this country which is engaged exclusively
in long-term mortgage financing. The principal lenders combine mortgage activities with
their other functions. COLEAxx, Amtlic.cx HOUSING 252 (1944). For the volume of
mortgages held by each kind of lender as of May 31, 1951, ,ee Real Estate Loans of
Registrants uder Rcgulation X, 33 FEP. Rrs. Bu.. 621, table 1 (1952).
9. "The difference between a mortgage company, a mortgage broker, and a real
estate broker is not always clear. Generally, the main activity of real estate brokers is
bringing buyers and sellers of real estate together; that of mortgage brokers is bringing
borrowers and lenders together; and that of mortgage companies is investing funds for
their own account or for the account of others. These activities are clusely related tu
the real estate market, and at times becomes so merged that one enterp~rise engages to
some extent in all three activities." FED. REs. Buu.., supra note 8, at 623.
10. Id. at 620-4. See also note 46 infra.
11. The Fisk University study reached the following conclusion: "Interviews with
fifteen large real estate investment institutions in Chicago and Cleveland showed the
clear design of segregation policy. First, their concern has ben, apparently, to prevent
any large scale relocations of the Negro population outside the existing racial cmpuund
... [although] it was generally indicated . . . that where business had i cn done vith
Negroes the results were satisfactory." LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPE. Vs. PfpiieL. ('2-3
(1947). New York civic organizations concerned with housing segiativn state that
a similar reluctance to lend to Negroes exists on the part of financial institutions doing
business in that city. Interviews with leaders of civic organizations, real estate bro!zer,,
and home builders in the New York City area (hereinafter cited as I:mrzzivinws). On
February 2 of this year a bill w-as introduced bufore the state legislature seeling to pro-
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have restricted competition in both the construction 12 and the purchase 13 of
homes.
The Combination or Conspiracy
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes only concerted action.14 However,
explicit agreement need not be shown; circumstantial evidence of agreement,
either express or implied, is sufficient.' 5 In recent years, this concept has
been extended so that consciously parallel action by persons in the same busi-
ness creates an inference of conspiracy. The clearest exposition of this doctrine
is the Third Circuit's opinion in Milgram v. Loew's.'0 There, the owner of a
drive-in theatre brought suit against a number of motion picture distributors
who refused to license first-run features to him. In upholding a finding of
conspiracy the court held a showing of uniform business practices, with
each participant aware of what the others were doing, sufficient to create an
inference of joint action.' 7 Defendants then had the burden of going forward
to overcome the inference.' 8
hibit racial or religious discrimination in mortgage lending. SEN. REP. No. 1421, INT. No.
1340 (1954). The difficulties facing Negro veterans attempting to secure loans to finance
the building of the own homes is reported in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
CIIL RIGHTS 68 (1947). For fuller discussion of restrictive lending practices, see
WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 222-7 (1948); LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERT'Y
62-7 (1947); NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL, EQUALITY OF OP-
PORTuNrrY IN HOUSING 17-18 (1952). For a study of the restrictive lending policies of
Manhattan savings banks in regard to properties in the Harlem area of New York, see
HARLEi MORTGAGE AND IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL, HARLEM A NEGLECTED INVESThIENT
OPPORTUNITY (1951).
12. See note 11 mpra. The Department of Housing Activities of the National Urban
League recently published a survey of its attempts to aid a number of large builders to
secure funds for all-Negro developments in the south and open-occupancy projects in the
north. The report stated: "It has been difficult to secure adequate mortgage finance in
this field because in most instances minority identified properties and neighborhoods are
not considered entirely on their merit. Negative factors and misinformation that have no
real relationship to the actual economics of housing are too frequently included as criteria
which in turn influence final consideration." JOHNSON, MORTGAGE FINANCING FOR Pi '-
ERTIES AVAILABLE TO NEGRO OCCUPANCY 1 (publication of the Department of Housing
Activities, National Urban League 1.954).
13. See note 11 supra. One well-known Negro leader contacted twenty-eight lenders
before securing a loan to purchase property in a white area of a northern city. NATIONAL
COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 17.
14. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614
(1914) ; United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Single traders may violate § I by entering into contracts in restraint of trade. However,
this provision does not appear applicable to the instant problem.
15. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount, 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954) ; American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939) ; Eastern Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
16. 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952). For a discussion
of earlier cases developing the "conscious parallelism" doctrine, see id. at 583-4.
17. Id. at 583.
18. Id. at 584.
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The scope of this doctrine was considered at the present term of the Supreme
Court. In Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount,19 the Court held that the con-
sciously parallel action of several motion picture producers and distribut rs
in excluding first-run features from suburban Baltimore theatres was not
enough in itself to secure a directed verdict.20 The Supreme Court did indi-
cate, however, that evidence of consciously parallel behavior is sufficient to
create a jury question on the issue of conspiracy.21 Thus, if suit were brought
against a number of institutions that lend in a particular area,2 uniform re-
fusal to lend to Negroes or to those who construct Negro housing could create
an inference of joint action. It would not be difficult to show that each lender
was aware of the similar policies being followed by its competituri. In
Milgram, such mutual aw-nareness was established when the trial judge found
that "[I]t is simply not possible that branch managers did not keep track of
what their competitors were doing. . . ... And evidence to support the in-
ference thus created could often be gathered in particular cases. 2
Among the possible defenses to a conspiracy allegation, the following are
most likely to occur:
(1) Each lender exercised its independent judgment in deciding that the
requests for loans involved poor risks. This is the reason generally given when
requests are denied.2- Yet suit would be brought only in a situation in which
a policy of continually rejecting good risks could be shown to exist.2 6
19. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
20. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount, 346 U.S. 537, 540-2 (1954).
21. This is apparent from the trial proceedings where the only evidmence intriduced by
plaintiff ars that of consciously parallel action and a dccree entered against the same defend-
ants in an earlier anti-trust case. The Supreme Court gave n) indication that tIher,: would
not have been a jury question without the decree. "This evidence, together with other
testimony of an explanatory nature [by defendants], raised fact issues requiring the trial
judge to submit the issue of conspiracy to the jury." Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount,
346 U.S. 537, 542 (1954).
Cf. Milgram v. Loew's, 192 F.2d 579, 5,3 (3d Cir. 1951), ccrt. dcmicd, 343 U.S.
929 (1952).
22. It may be desirable to bring suit against only one kind of institution (e.g., ravings
banks or insurance companies) at a time since mutual av.arene.s of parallel activities
might be more easily shown among such firms.
23. 94 F. Supp. 416, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1950). This finding was specifically accepted by
the circuit court. Milgrim v. Loew's, 192 F2d 579, 5,2-3 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. dcnicd,
343 U.S. 929 (1952).
24. It is reported, for example, that a New York bank has prepared maps indicating
areas in the city occupied by different racial groups; these are said to have ben distributed
among the various institutional lenders doing business in New York. N.Y. Amsterdam
News, Nov. 23, 1953, p. 5, col. 1. In a 1947 meeting of New York real estate group ,
mortgage executives voiced sharp disapproval of a city anti-discrimination law applying
to developments enjoying tax and condemnation benefits. They had previumly met as a
group to discuss the matter with the state housing commissioner. W Tu Ntu
GHErro 314-5 (1948).
25. INTERviEws.
26. Discriminatory lending policies appear to be all-inclusive, touching good as well
as bad risks. See LoNG & JoH.Nso-, PEOPLE vs. PLrERn" L4-5 (1947); Jouso::, MV.-a-
GAGE FINANCING FOR PROPERTms AVAiLziBLE To NE,:;ro OccuPA.cy (publication of the
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(2) Each lender feared that some customers would cease to do business
with it if it aided Negro occupancy in their area, and therefore each independ-
ently decided not to do so. 2 7 The major shortcoming of this argument lies in
the element of proof, for mere voicing of such fears would not have much
probative value.28 Moreover it is doubtful that actual threats of withdrawing
business could be shown.
2 9
(3) Each lender acted independently to further a personal desire to keep
the area involved predominantly white. Yet, if this were the case, a trier
of fact might well infer that each lender had a similar interest in seeing to it
that none of the others disturbed the prevailing racial makeup. 30
In weighing the possible effectiveness of these defenses, two things must
be kept in mind. The inference of concerted action created by consciously
parallel business activities remains a strong factor which the judge or jury
must consider. And the very use of the first two defenses may aid in proving
the alleged conspiracy. For, the Milgram court said: "The voicing of the
same invalid reasons for identical equivocal actions is of itself sufficient from
which to infer guilt."'"
The Restraint
Competition in the mortgage market is sharply curtailed by the practices
of lending institutions. 32  The builder with plans for Negro occupancy is at
Department of Housing Activities, National Urban League 1954); WEAVER, THE NEGRO
GHETrO 227 (1948); HARLEM MORTGAGE AND IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL, HARLEM A NEG-
LECTED INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY (1951); AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES IN 1953: A BALANCE SHEET OF GROUP RELATIONS 100-101 (1954); Cooper,
Harlem Progress Ciecked as Banks Shun Loans There, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1950,
§ 8, p. Ri, col. 8.
27. See LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE Vs. PROPERTY 63 (1947).
28. Defendants would have to introduce evidence from which reasonable menl could
conclude that lenders who financed Negro occupancy would probably lose other customers.
Otherwise, it is doubtful that the trier of fact would find that they had followed the same
policy independently.
29. INTERVIEWS. Furthermore, if lenders were able to show that certain large custom-
ers had made such threats, the latter might be joined as co-conspirators.
30. Cf. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 365 (1912): "The necessary
control could only come about through concerted action. If one of the several independent
groups of defendants, or two, or any number less than all, had sought to obtain control,
it would have been resisted by those not included. Therefore, it is plain that [if the goal
was to be achieved], it must be brought about through the concerted action of the de-
fendants."
Concerted action may violate the Sherman Act although the underlying motive is not
economic. See Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 Fed. 390 (8th Cir.
1920) (suit successfully brought against State Council of Defense of New Mexico for
urging newsdealers and citizens not to sell or to read Hearst publications because of their
"disloyal and pro-German sentiments"). See also Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp.
662 (D. Nev. 1952).
31. Milgram v. Loew's, 192 F.2d 579, 585 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929
(1952).
32. Open occupancy builders and Negro home purchasers may be able to secure
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a severe disadvantage in the competition to secure financing for construction
plans; the Negro home purchaser cannot keep pace with the white in his
efforts to secure mortgage loans. Consequently, the Negro finds it difficult to
secure adequate housing, and he is forced to pay more than whites do for
comparable dwellings.33
The concerted refusal of lending institutions to deal with open-occupancy
builders and Negro home purchasers constitutes a boycott.3 4 This kind of
limited mortgage money from some lenders; this, however, does not remove the restrictive
practices of the others from the Sherman Act's scope. See Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), where by-laws of the Associated Press, which sharply restricted
membership and forbade members to furnish news to outsiders, were held to constitute
illegal restraints of trade. In the course of its opinion the Court said: "It is further
contended that since there are other news agencies which sell news, it is not a violation
of the Act for an overwhelming majority of the American publishers to combine to decline
to sell their news to the minority. But the fact that an agreement to restrain trade does
not inhibit competition in all the objects of that restraint cannot save it from the con-
demnation of the Sherman Act. It is apparent that the exclusive right to publish news
in a given field, furnished by AP and all of its members, gives many newspapers a com-
petitive advantage over their rivals.' Id. at 17.
33. 1940 census figures for selected cities show that in any given rental or sales
bracket a greater proportion of nonwhites than whites lives in substandard dwellings.
E.g., 20.9% of all nonwhites who paid a monthly rental of $30-39, or whose homes had
that estimated rental value, lived in substandard dwellings; only 7.7c of whites in the
$30-39 range occupied substandard units. The ratio of nonwhites to whites in all price
brackets for substandard tenant and owner-occupied units is 3 to 1. See Robinson,
Relationship Between Condition of Dwellings and Rentals, By Race, 22 J. LAimt & P.U.
Eco.N. 296 (1946). For additional discussion, see VAvEnR, THE N rno GHTTo 261-6
(1948).
Price differences between comparable white and nonwhite homes in two San Francisco
areas were the subject of a recent study. The homes were carefully selected so that at
last one in each area had almost identical characteristics with one or more in the other
area. A significant entry of nonwhites had taken place in the "test area" since 1940, prior
to which it had been all white. No nonwhites lived in the second or "control area." The
sales prices of comparable homes which had been sold in each area from 1949 to 1951 were
examined. In 77.4% of the cases where nonwhites bought homes in the test area, they
paid more than whites did in the control area. The mean difference in price for each house
was' $335. Laurenti, Effects of Nonwhite Purchases ons Market Prices of Residences, THm
APprAsIAL J. 314 (1952). For further discussion, see WEAvEn, op. cit. supra at 36, 119, 250,
291-2; LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE vs. PRoPERTY 3-6, 37-8 (1947) ; Mlyo., A-. Aimmcm-c
Dn.Emr-,.A 379 (1944) ; WooFT, NRo PnoBtE.s IN CiTiEs 121-35 (1928) ; HousuNG
AND HomE FINANCE AGENCy, HousING OF THE NovWurrT PoPuLATIoNr 1940 To 1950
2 (1952) ; Morgan, Values in Transition Areas: Some Nez, Concepts, Rev. Soc'y Resi-
dential Appraisers, March 1952, p. 5. See also discussion and sources cited in Brief
for Petitioners, pp. 47-50, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1943). Uncontroverted testimony
was presented in the case to the effect that homes in certain areas could te sold for 30%
more to Negroes than whites; similar testimony concerned excessive rentals. Id. at 61-2.
Federal court opinions dealing with restrictive covenants in specific areas have accepted
the fact that Negroes paid higher housing prices than whites. See Gospel Spreading Asso-
ciation v. Bennetts, 147 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F2d
23, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 873, 874 (D.C. Cir.)
(dissenting opinion of Edgerton, J.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. E63 (1945).
34. A primary boycott is "a combination.., to refrain from dealing with [another]."
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1921).
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activity has been declared illegal with such consistency as to suggest its pcr
se illegality. 5 However, assuming that the "rule of reason" is to be applied
to such activities, proof of economic justification is admissible to show that the
restraint is not an undue or an unreasonable one.8 0
A defense of economic justification by lenders may include: (1) a claim
that extensive lending for Negro housing will result in a protest withdrawal
of business by many customers,3 7 and (2) the argument that allowing Negroes
to move into white areas will depreciate property values and endanger certain
of the lenders' investments there. In most situations, however, it does not
seem that these defenses would vindicate the practices involved. Fear of a
loss of customers appears unfounded in actual experience.38 And it has been
shown that the movement of Negroes into white neighborhoods has no
generally depressing effect on prices; in some instances there is a decline in
prices at first, but this is usually followed by a return to the previous price
level, if not to a higher one.3 9
35. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) ; Standard Sanitary Manufacturing
Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). And see discussion and cases cited in Kirk-
patrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 Gro. WAsi.
L. REv. 302, 387 (1942) ; Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58
YALE L.J. 1121, 1138-40 (1949).
36. There is indication that one type of boycott, a refusal to deal with someone as
a means of preventing him from dealing with a third party, is illegal per se. See Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) ; United States v. Waltham
Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See also United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). Some writers believe that the per se rule extends beyond
this and encompasses "every commercial boycott which affects the relations between an
outsider and a member of the combination or others. . . ." Kirkpatrick, supra note
35, at 306. One commentator states that it reaches all "boycotts growing out of joint
action among competitors. . . ." Adams, The "Rule of Reasone': Workable Competition
or Workable Moiwpoly.', 63 YAIE L.J. 348, 3,19 (1954). The Supreme Court, however,
has never clearly decided any boycott case on the basis of a per se violation approach;
the law on the subject, therefore, is still uncertain. See Comment, Refusals to Sell and
Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1138-40 (1949). Consequently, thlis
comment will assume that evidence of economic necessity may still be introduced to
justify a boycott. But see note 40 infra.
37. This defense was previously considered only with respect to whether or not joint
action was present. See p. xxx supra.
38. IN=ERViEWS.
39. One observer, a former deputy chief appraiser of the Federal Housing Admillistra-
tion, says, "Actually whether prices rise or fall depends upon the extent of the demand
and the ability of the market to bid up prices, and has nothing to do whatsoever with
racial characteristics." Morgan, Values in Transition Areas: Some New Concepts, Rev.
Soc'y Residential Appraisers, March, 1952, p. 5, col. 1.
Most observers, however, seem to agree that initial Negro entry into an all white
area may depress prices for a while. When this does occur, it is usually because of a
"panic" effect on the part of some whites; the latter, feeling that the value of the property
will go down, rush to sell it and thus themselves cause it to depreciate in value. In
instances where this does happen, however, the price decline is usually only temporary.
See WEAVER, THE NEGRO Gra-rro 279-301; LONG & JoHNsoN, PEOPLE VS. PRO'unlry 5-0J
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Moreover, these defenses are not of the kind which is likely to succeed even
under a "rule of reason" approach to boycotts.40  The Sherman Act looks
primarly to the effects of particular practices on competition and less to motive
or intent. 1 Therefore, unless lenders can show that the net effect of their
restrictive practices is to promote rather than to suppress competition, their
defenses will be unavailing.2
Interstate Comnmerce
A refusal to lend for the construction or the purchase of homes for Negroes
may be shown to involve a restraint on interstate commerce within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act. For mortgage lending itself is largely an interstate
activity. And, furthermore, where there is a refusal to lend for construction
purposes, the resultant decrease in the interstate flow of building materials
also satisfies the interstate commerce requirement.
Mortgage Lending as an Interstate Actwity. Objection may be raised that
mortgage lending is an intrastate business because the object of the restraint,
the mortgage contract, is of a wholly local nature. This objection was answered
by the Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Undewritcrs
Ass'n.4 3 Nearly 200 fire insurance companies were charged with having vio-
late § 1 by conspiring to fix premium rates and agents' commissions. In re-
versing a dismissal of the indictment, the Court held that although the insur-
(1947); Abrams, The Nc-, "'Gresham's Law of Xeighborhod"-Fact or Fiction, 19
APPRAisAL JounrnAL 324 (1951). AMEmcA.N JEwisH Co:zGREs AiD NA7xO:AL Asso lA-
TION FoR THE ADVANcrE-T OF COLOR-M PEOLE, Civu. RIGHTS IM THE UNITED ST,.s
rn 1953: A BALA-C SHEEr OF GRoup RFLATIONS 103-104 (1954). See also text at note
111 infra.
40. "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition." Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918). See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-64 (1911) ;
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 105, 17380 (1911) ; American Feder-
ation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 13 F2d 869, 872 (4th Cir. 1950). Restrictions on
competition are not actually justified under the rule of reason. Rather, practices which on
their face appear to be restrictions on competition are showvn to promote competition upon
analysis of the actual operation of a particular market.
41. "[A] specific intent, or good motive, for that matter, is not material when we deal
with Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The determining
consideration is the effect of a particular practice on interstate trade or commerce. Other
considerations, szwch as econowic necessity, do not, and should not enter into our inquiry
whether the practices here involved violate either statute." (Court's emphasis). United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 2 6-7 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S.
922 (1952). See also Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 2S2 U.S. 30,
44 (1930) and cases collected at 1 CCH Tn.%DE REG. Rrx. (9th ed.) T 1,0121, pp. 1054-7
(1952). Parties are held to have intended the necessary and direct consequences of their
acts. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1943); United States v.
Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913).
42. See note 40 supra.
43. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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ance contract itself was local in nature the entire transaction ".... constituted
a single continuous chain of events, many of which were multistate in char-
acter." 44 These multistate events were the movement of checks, drafts, and
other commercial paper from the home offices of the member companies to
their various out-of-state branches.45
Mortgage lending today necessarily involves such interstate movements.
These arise as a result of the heavy volume of interstate lending done by
financial institutions 46 and the large percentage of loan insurance undertaken
44. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 537 (1944).
45. Id. at 541. It may be contended that mortgage contracts cannot be considered
"commodities" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. This argument was used by
defendants in the South-Eastern case in regard to insurance contracts. Justice Black,
however, speaking for the majority, ruled that the Supreme Court had continually held
that "Congress can regulate traffic though it consist of intangibles." Id. at 546.
46. Though no comprehensive survey of the interstate connections of the mortgage
business has ever been made, the material that does exist indicates that a considerable per-
centage of the mortgage money in a given area is of out-of-state origin. Lending insti-
tutions may secure interstate mortgage holdings through the establishment of branch
offices in various cities, as a result of direct contact with their home office staffs, by the
purchase of already-negotiated mortgages from independent non-institutional lenders,
and through the employment of other non-institutional lenders known as "correspondents"
who act as local agents of the large firms. SAULNIER, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING By
Lirx INSURANCE COmPANIES 30-1 (1950). The non-institutional lenders deal primarily
with out-of-state institutions and are active mainly when local funds are inadequate to
meet financing demand. The "correspondents" and "independents" are usually mortgage
companies, mortgage brokers or real estate brokers. They are primarily servicers of
loans, rather than holders for their own account. Thus, areas in which they play a
major part in the lending process will depend mainly on out-of-state mortgage funds.
Two recent studies have examined the participation of loan servicers in mortgage
markets throughout the nation. Schechter, National and Local Mortgage Market Struc-
tures, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Housing Research, Oct. 1952, p. 9; Real
Estate Loans of Registrants Under Regulation X, 38 FED. REs. BULL. 620 (1952). The
Schechter study concerned itself largely with the mortgage structures of fifteen metro-
politan areas. By noting the volume of lending activity of mortgage companies in these
areas, it was able to conclude that six of them (Miami, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Pitts-
burgh, and Washington, D.C.) were probably heavily dependent on outside financing.
The pattern of lending in Boston and New York-northeastern New Jersey, however,
suggested highly self-sufficient mortgage markets. Cleveland and San Francisco were
found to rely primarily on local funds, with outside lenders exerting "a significant
marginal influence." Figures for the five other areas (Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, and Seattle) indicated that the importance of out-of-state financing was
somewhere in between that found in the first six cities and the Boston and New York-
northeastern New Jersey areas. Schechter, supra at 10, 15-6.
Mr. Schechter's view of the importance of out-of-state financing for home purchase is:
"Primary financing of the purchase of homes is undertaken by financial institutions
outside of the state in which the property is located in significant volume, particularly
by large life insurance companies and savings banks." Communication to the YALrE LAW
JOURNAL from Henry B. Schechter, financial economist of the Housing Branch of the
Housing and Home Finance Agency, dated Oct. 28, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
The second study of interstate mortgage financing was undertaken by the Division
of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve System, and was centered on informa-
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by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans' Administration.4 7
Since the home offices of the latter two organizations are in the District of
Columbia, their mortgage activities involve the flow of commercial paper
referred to in the South-Eastern case.
To bring suit under the Sherman Act, however, one cannot merely group
as co-conspirators a number of lenders who do business in more than one state.
It is necessary to delineate the market in which the alleged restraint of trade
exists.48 Potential defendants are those lenders which compete in this market.
In many areas of the country, these will be mainly out-of-state firms ;49 here,
tion filed by 44,000 lenders in response to a new registration requirement of the Board
of Governors. Conclusions were based on an analysis of the participation of loan servicers
in lending activities in the federal reserve districts. Noting that the information obtained
permitted only broad geographic comparisons, the study stated: "The data nevertheless
suggest that an appreciable part of the funds for financing real estate in the Richmond,
Atlanta, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Dallas Districts comes from the financial districts
such as Boston and New York, and from Chicago and San Francisco.... The movement
of funds from one part of the country to another has been encouraged by investors seel:ing
outlets for large amounts of funds .... Both institutional and noninstitutional registrants
participate in this movement of funds. Insurance companies and other institutional lenders
hold large amounts of loans on real estate located at a distance and in many instances
have them serviced by noninstitutional lenders close to the properties." FED. r.s. Bu..,
supra at 620, 627, 621.
This study showed that of the total amount of loans held by large firms which had
registered ($53.3 billion), more than one-fourth ($13.4 billion) had been initially secured
by regular servicers. An additional 4,% v.as serviced for large firms by other institu-
tional lenders. (Although the non-institutional lenders also held some mortgages on their
own account [$3.3 billion], it is doubtful that any significant amount of this had been
serviced for them.) Id. at 621. Some of the loan servicing Was undoubtedly done for large
lenders located in the same state as the servicer. Still, the figures probably largely under-
state the total volume of interstate lending; they do not take into account loans directly
secured by large firms on out-of-state property. See note 54 infra.
Insurance companies engage in an especially large volume of out-of-state lending.
The Schechter study indicates that even in San Francisco and Hagerstown, Maryland, a
small self-sufficient area, out-of-state insurance loans were significant. In San FranciEco,
13% of the 1950 recorded mortgages of under $20,000 came from outside insurance com-
panies; 17% of the 1950 Hagerstown mortgages were also of this nature. Schechter, supra
at 13. For indication of the national scope of insurance company mortgage lending, see
SAULNIER, supra at 3S-9.
47. A loan guaranty by one of these agencies assures the lending institution that in
the event of a borrower's default a certain percentage of the loan will be made good.
As of May 31, 1951, 47.6% of all mortgages on residential properties held by institu-
tional lenders were FHA insured or VA guaranteed. 39.2% of the residential property
mortgages of non-institutional lenders were similarly backed by these agencies. The
breakdown for the separate institutional lenders is as follows: commercial banks, 54.5%;
mutual savings banks, 47.7%; savings and loan associations, 27.6,; insurance cvmpanies,
61.4%. In the non-institutional lender group, 55.1% of the residential property mortgages
of the combined holdings of mortgage companies, mortgage brokers, and real estate
brokers were FHA insured or VA guaranteed. See FED. Ris. BuLL, supra note 46, at 626.
48. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610-11
(1953).
49. See note 46 supra.
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the involvement of interstate commerce is apparent. This kind of lending
situation is especially likely to exist outside of the major financial centers.50
A variation of this situation is often found in these areas. The mortgage
may initially be procured from a small local firm doing business on its own
account. Unable to participate in long-term financing, however, the firm will
then sell the mortgage to a large out-of-state financial institution. 1 This is
known as secondary financing. 52 If a refusal to lend for Negro housing were
found to exist in such an area, suit would be directed against those firms
which do the initial lending; they select the mortgagees. Although these
defendants are not themselves interstate lenders, their business of necessity
affects interstate activities. Numerous cases have held that a business need
not be in interstate commerce to satisfy the requirements of the Sherman Act
-it is sufficient that it affects such commerce.5 3
50. This is due to the heavy concentration of mortgage capital in certain sections of
the United States (primarily the northeast) and the paucity of lending funds available in
other parts. See Schechter, supra note 46, at 9; FED. REs. BULL., supra note 46, at 627-8.
51. This situation differs from that in which a "correspondent" first secures the mort-
gage; there the initial purchaser acts as awagent for the large-scale lender. Here lie
buys on his own account, later seeking a permanent holder. See FED. RES BULL., supra
note 46, at 620-1; SAULNIER, supra note 46, at 30-1.
52. A detailed study of one such area, Jacksonville, Florida, was recently undertaken
by the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Examining mortgage lending in that city for
the first six months of 1950, the study disclosed that of $21 million of loans made, $16.6
million, or nearly 80%, came from outside of the state; $15.2 million was bought on the
secondary market. Approximately one-half of the outside funds came from the Federal
National Mortgage Association, a federal agency which purchases mortgages from inde-
pendent servicing firms. Most of the remaining half came from lenders in New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE Auuncy,
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FINANCING, JACKSONVILLE. FLORIDA, FIRST SIX MONTS or 1950
(1952).
53. "The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of a contract or
combination usually is; the application of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is;
but neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the
states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local
the operation which applies the squeeze." United States v. Women's Sportswear Manu-
facturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) (combination of Boston stitching contractors
to force jobbers to employ only members of their association held to affect the influx of
cloth to Massachusetts and the outgo of finished garments). See also, United States v.
Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) (complaint alleging that conspiracy
to suppress competition among Chicago plastering contractors affected flow of plastering
materials into Illinois held to state cause of action) ; Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1947) (combination to fix prices of California beet
sugar held to affect subsequent interstate sale of the refined product); United States v.
Chrysler Corporation, 180 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1950) (complaint alleging that conspiracy
to fix retail prices of Chrysler replacement parts and engines in Washington affected inter-
state movement of such materials held to state cause of action).
In other cases where the source of the restraint is local, the courts may talk of a
continuous flow of commerce rather than adopt the "affect" approach. See, e.g., Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (local radio station's receipt of news,
musical recordings and advertising from outside of state held restrained by withdrawal
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Suit may also be brought in the large financial centers themselves. Even
here out-of-state funds are often used to finance construction and home pur-
chase; it has been stated that over one-fourth of the mortgage financing in
New York City originates from out-of-state firms." In other sections within
the financial centers a greater percentage of competing lenders may come from
within the state. But given concerted action, they may be joined as defendants
with the out-of-state firms; for one conspirator is liable for every act of another
done in furtherance of the conspiracy2gz Furthermore, the mortgage lending
activities of these local firms affect interstate commerce in another way. Every
long-term lender handles a large volume of FHA and VA insured loans;-6by refusing to advance mortgage money to the Negyo market, many trans-
actions that would otherwise be consummated with the FHA and VA do not
take place.
5 7
Effect on Building Materials. In all states the amount of building materials
coming from out-of-state sources is substantial?9- The decreased flow of such
materials stemming from a refusal to lend to builders meets the Sherman Act's
of local advertising); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (cab
transportation of passengers from one railroad station in Chicago to another held to b2
part of the stream of interstate commerce); Swift and Co. v. United States, 195
U.S. 375, 399 (1905) (purchase of cattle in local stockyards held to be part of interstate
transit of cattle to the yards) ; Greater New York Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce
v. United States, 47 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1931) (sale of poultry by New York receivers to
New York wholesalers held to be part of interstate movement of the 1aultry). The
initial securing of mortgages by small firms would appear susceptible of similar treatment
as part of a single flow of commerce.
For a comprehensive discussion of the "affect" and "flow" theories, se Las Vcgas
Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954). See notes
117-119 i;fra, and accompanying text.
54. Complaint, p. 6, f1 9, United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York, Civil
No. 37-247, S.D.N.Y., August 6, 1946. The conclusions of the mortgage studieF, see note
46 supra, as to the localized structure of the NLw York-northeastern New Jersey lending
market, were based on the small amount of l,-an servicing done in that area. This, how-
ever, did not preclude the possibility that out-of-state institutions might make direct
loans there; and the complaint in the Mortgage Co;zference case states that appro:-imately
25% of the mortgage money in New York City originated in this fashi_,n. The entry of
additional out-of-state funds was alleged to result from the activities of n-ortgage cor-
respondents of outside firms. Complaint, s',pra at p. 6, I 9.
55. "[One may conspire with ojthers to restrain interstate commerce though he may
not himself be engaged in that commerce." United States v. General Motors Corp., 2
F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Ili. 1942). See also Federal Trade Cmmission v. Curol't Institute,
333 U.S. 6q3, 696 (194) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F2d 93, 115 (6th
Cir. 1944), aff'd, 323 U.S. 781 (1946) ; Uiiit.d States v. American Column & Lumhser
Co., 263 Fed. 147 (W.D. Tenn. 1920), aff'd, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). Lecal lenders could
similarly be joined as co-conspirators in areas outside of the financial centers.
56. See note 47 surpra.
57. Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 3M U.S. 533 (1944).
And see discussion at notes 117-119 infra, and accompanying text.
58. See AB-xAos, RE-CLETION i., L.xrr 27, 49 (1939). It has been estimated that
in the years just before the last war more than DO, ,.f the materials us'd in the contruc-
tion of new homes in Ntlw York City came from outside the state. Complaint, p. 9, 13,
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interstate commerce requirement. A recent Supreme Court decision clearly
shows that interference with the flow of building materials across state lines
constitutes a burden on interstate commerce. In NLRB v. Denver Building
& Construction Trades Council," it was held that the commerce clause gave
the NLRB jurisdiction over a dispute in the building trade because the disa-
greement might have prevented building materials from crossing state lines. 0
This case did not involve the Sherman Act. However, courts have stated
many times that in passing the Act Congress intended to use the full scope
of its regulatory powers under the commerce clause."' Thus, cases passing
on the breadth of that clause with respect to other statutes have been held
applicable to Sherman Act litigation.0 2
The generally broad interpretations given the commerce clause lend addi-
tional support to the showing of interstate commerce. Courts have usually
been ready to find the requisite burden on such commerce in cases which
otherwise satisfy statutory requirements. Thus, they have found that inter-
state commerce is burdened by the activities of janitors in a building where
some of the offices did interstate work,0 3 by the labor practices of a newspaper
with an out-of-state circulation of Y2 of 1%,04 and by the price of milk which
is produced and sold intrastate but which competes with milk shipped from
outside the state.0 5
Prior Litigation
The Sherman Act has been invoked to attack housing segregation in one
case. A refusal to lend was involved. In United States v. Mortgage Confer-
ence of New York, 60 the federal government charged 39 banks, insurance
United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York, Civil No. 37-247, S.D.N.Y.,
August 6, 1946.
59. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
60. See also United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n of Chicago, 347 U.S. 186
(1954) (Sherman Act case) ; United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n of Chicago, 347
U.S. 198 (1954) (same).
61. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 558
(1944); Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); Las
Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 (9th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Chrysler Corp., 180 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1950).
62. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 549
(1944) ; opinion of Frank, J., and cases cited therein, in Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d
402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949).
63. NLRB v. Tri-State Casualty Insurance Co., 188 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1951) (La1bor
Management Relations Act of 1947).
64. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938).
65. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937).
66. United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York, 1948-49 CCN Tmutn CAsS
62,616. See also, Complaint, United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York, Civil
No. 37-247, S.D.N.Y., August 6, 1946.
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companies and trust companies engaged in mortgage lending in New York
with a violation of § 1. The refusal to lend was only one of a number of
charges; other allegations concerned fixing of minimum interest rates on loans,
uniform appraisal procedures, and other restrictive practices.c1  A consent
decree was entered ordering the dissolution of the Conference and enjoining
defendants from continuing alleged illegal practices.
In dealing with the segregation question, the government claimed the
following:
(1) Defendants, who initiated more than 60% of the mortgage loans made
in New York City,6s had prepared maps indicating blocks in which Negroes
and Spanish-speaking peoples lived, and refused to lend mortgage money to
persons in those areas. 9
(2) As a result of these practices, individuals in the designated areas were
deprived of the benefits of normal competition 70 and were forced to pay higher
prices for comparable dwellings in other parts of the city. 71
(3) The restraint involved interstate commerce because of its effect upon
the flow of applications, letters, drafts, and other communications across
state lines,72 and upon the quantity of building materials entering New York
from other states.73
Because these discriminatory practices furnished only one of a number of
separate charges in the complaint, it is difficult to ascertain their importance in
securing the ultimate consent decree. One conclusion that can be drawn, how-
ever, is that defendants apparently believed the government's showing of
interstate commerce to be adequate; the two alleged effects on interstate
commerce were common to all the restraints listed in the complaint. 4
REFUSAL To SELL
Negro community leaders state that it is so difficult for the Negro to pur-
chase 75 a home in a white area that he feels it almost hopeless to try.76 When
67. Complaint, p. 10, [ 15, United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York,
Civil No. 37-247, S.D.N.Y., August 6, 1946.
68. Id. at 6, 11 .
69. Id. at 11, f 16(i).
70. Id. at 12, 1 17(a)-(c).
71. Id. at 12, 1f 17(d).
72. Id. at 12, f1 17(g).
73. Id. at 12, 11 17(h).
74. Id. at 12, 1f 17.
75. This comment will not deal wvith the possibility of using § 1 against a refiwal
to rent to Negroes; the activities involved here appear to be entirely loaml in nature.
Section 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 ST.T. 209 (1S90), 15 U.S.C. § 3 (194o), h;ever,
can be used to attack restrictive rental policies in the District uf Columbia. This Ftoction
contains the same provisions as § 1 with the absence of the interstate commnLrce require-
ment, Congress having exercised its plenary power over the nation's capital.
Anti-trust litigation in the District would be of significance in bringing tn;,re com-
petitive conditions to the housing market, this area being one (f the most highly segre-
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he does make the attempt, he is met with rejections. 77 This near elimination
of the Negro as a competitive factor in most sales markets has generally con-
fined him to small congested districts with homes of inferior quality.78 Here,
despite any ability to pay for his own home, he must often content himself
with a rental unit to be shared with other families.7 9 And the price for this
type of dwelling is usually high.80
gated in the nation. For discussion of discriminatory practices there, see REPo r OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMIrTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 91-2 (1947); Brief for Petitioners, Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). See Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 235, 243-4 (D.C. Cir.
1947) (dissenting opinion of Edgerton, J.), ree'd, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
The arguments to bring a refusal to rent within the Sherman Act are essentially the same
as for a refusal to sell. The landlord-defendant may be a large builder constructing rental
units, in which case he may be held to have conspired with his subsidiaries, See note 84
infra, and accompanying text. In other cases a group of neighborhood landlords might be
joined as co-conspirators, their consciously parallel actions creating an inference of
combination.
76. INTERVIEWS.
77. See pp. xxxx-xxxx infra. Conditions sometimes become so intolerable that the
Negro is led to employ some subterfuge in order to secure adequate housing. Thus, lie
may have a friend buy a home in a white area and then convey the deed to him,
INTERviEVS. See also WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 104 (1948).
78. The 1950 Bureau of Census housing figures reveal that overcrowding among non-
whites in residential dwellings is four times as great as among whites. HOUSING AND HOME
FINANCE AGENCY, HOUSING OF THE NONWHITE POPULATION 1940 To 1950 1-2 (1952).
The proportion of dilapidated residential homes among nonwhites is five times as high
as among whites (27% to 5.4%). Id. at 2. It has been estimated that even before the
wartime increase, the Harlem area in New York was so heavily populated that "[a]t the
same rate of density the entire population of the United States would live in one-half
the geographic area of New York City." NATIONAL CoMaUra'y RELATIONS ADVISORY
COUNCIL, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 6 n.* (1952). For further discussion
and statistics, see HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, supra at 8, 10, 12, 34-7;
WEAVER, THE NEGRo GHETrO 99-124 (1948); LONG & JOHNSON, PEOP1LE VS. POPERnTY
2-4 (1947); WooR, NEGRO PROBLEMS IN CITIEs 78-95 (1928); Morgan, Values in
Transition Areas: Some New Concepts, Rev. Soc'y Residential Appraisers, March 1952,
pp. 5-6; N.Y. Times, April 17, 1953, p. 27, col. 5. See also Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d
818, 831, 151 P.2d 260, 267 1944) (concurring opinion).
79. "Doubling up" is one of the most serious problems of Negro housing. "In 1950,
there were 339,000 nonwhite families living doubled up with other [nonwhite] families,
at a doubling rate of 15 percent or nearly three times that for white families. . . . Of
significance is the fact that between 1940 and 1950 doubling had decreased proportion-
ately for whites in all areas of residence, but among nonwhites it had actually increased
both numerically and proportionately. .. ." HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, Supra
note 78, at 10.
In early 1953, New York State Housing Commissioner Herman Stichman conducted
a "block-by-block" survey of Harlem tenements. He found apartments partitioned off so
that a different family could occupy each room and even different parts of the same room.
N.Y. Times, April 17, 1953, p. 27, col. 5. In one house, twelve families occupied two
seven room flats; the landlord derived a monthly income of $300 from them. N.Y. Post,
April 17, 1953, p. 5, col. 1, For additional discussion see LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS.
PROPERTY 33-5 (1947); WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHEro 104 n.* (1948); Wooi.-TER, NEGRO
PROBLEMS IN CITIES 78-95 (1928); NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADViSORY COUNCIL,
supra note 78 at 6; Velie, Housing: Detroit's Time Bomb, Collier's, Nov. 23, 1946, p. 14,
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The Combintation or Conspiracy
Combinations to refuse to sell to the Negro home buyer are principally
of three kinds. They may involve: operative builders of new projects, real
estate brokers, or individual home owners.
Operative Bilders.s ' The large-scale or operative builder sells the homes
which he himself constructs.s 2 His new projects open a large volume of hous-
ing in a given area at one time; they thus offer a significant opportunity to
widen the area of permissible Negro competition. Yet restrictive policies are
almost invariably adopted.83 In suits against such a builder, the conspiracy
See also Second Grand jury Presentment in Investigation of Enforcement of Laws Con-
cerning Hazardous and Unsanitary Conditions in Dwellings, County Court, IZings Coatnty,
New York, 'March 3, 1953.
SO. See sources cited notes 33, 78 and 79 supra.
81. Restrictive practices by large-scale builders must be considered refuals to sell
rather than refusals to build, since usually there is no refusal to build as such. The
builder has decided on the site, type of construction and other details on his own initiative,
and the houses will go up no matter to whom he sells; exclusionary practices enter
only when the units are offered for sale.
There is, however, one situation in which the restrictive policy of a large-cale builder
may be regarded as a refusal to build. This is where the builder has stated in advance
that he will not construct a particular project unless Negroes are to be ecludcd. One
example arose in the days before the construction of the huge Stuyvestant Town project
in New York. The builder, Mctropolitan Life Insurance Comrany, had indicated to city
authorities that it would accept their proposal to undertake private construetion only if
Negroes were excluded. For the factual background, see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Ttorn
Corporation, 299 N.Y. 512, 529, 87 N.E2d 541, 547 (1949). In this kind Uf .ituation a
builder could be charged with conspiring with its subsidiaries. See note 04 infra, and
accompanying text. And his practices would clearly affect the flow of building materials
across state lines.
82. See CoLEAN, AmmaicAiT HOUSING 222 (1944); Housi.-G AiD Honr. FINAM-E
AGEcY, FINANCITG HOUSE CoIsraucro IN THE: No. rHwEsr 11 (1951).
83. One of the more notorious recent examples of discriminatory p,liciks of large
builders is that adopted in the Levittown project in Long Island, New Yurk. Consisting
of 17,544 units, approximately 15,000 of which are owner-occupied, the lprojLct has l
closed to Negroes since the first homes were opened in Oct.,ber, 1947. The kaidr Ui
the project, William Levitt, published a statement in the community nee qlat' r in 1949
declaring that his admissions policy would remain unaltered despite the thn recoit
ShelF.ly case. ". . . Levittown has been and is now progressing as a private .nterpri-_
job, and ir'is entirely in the discretion and judgment of Levitt and SQYrs as to v.hi.tra
it will rent or sell." Levittown Tribune, June 2, 1949, p. 1, col. 3. Commnuiting tn potral
builder practices, he said: "The policy that has prevailvd in the I a t frow the v,y
inception of Levittown is ...the same policy that all builders in this area haw we p-
ted. . . ." Id. at 1, col. 3; 23, col. 5. No more than two Negro families haVe cv~r livo'
in Levittown at the same time. See LIELL, Lvx Trow. (uniublLhed the iis 6i I'rPf. J h
Liell, Dep't of Sociology, Yale University, in Yale University Library 1952). LLt year,
Levitt sold his remaining holdings in the project. The new ev.nuer, Henry Elpoin, liax
announced that all existing rental homes are to be converted into sales units. Levitt. ,.v'
Eagle, March 26, 1953, p. 1, col. 5.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People lists the Bue
County Project in Pennsylvania and the Park Forest Projc-t in Illin ,is as oth r larp
developments from which Negro home purchasers are excluded. NATIU:NAL .XS,,S AtmLw
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requirement can usually be satisfied because a corporation may be held to have
conspired with its subsidiaries.8 4 Most large builders are incorporated 85
and have one or more subsidiaries to handle various aspects of the building
process ;86 also, a new development corporation is usually chartered to handle
each new large job.8T
In some instances it might be feasible to join lending institutions and build-
ers as co-conspirators. Their interdependence in the housing enterprise is
substantial.8 8 A further possibility is that of joining a selling agent whom
the builder may have hired to dispose of his units.89 And sometimes those who
have already purchased homes in the development might be joined as co-
conspirators.90
Real Estate Brokers. The function of the real estate broker is to get buyer
and seller together in the housing market and to adjust demand to supply.91
The scattered supply of housing in any particular area 92 makes his coordinat-
ing function an important one.
The exclusionary practices of real estate brokers clearly involve consciously
parallel action. In a given area no broker will sell to Negroes;03 mutual
awareness of these activities results from the circulation of written information
and from the acquaintance brokers generally have with the housing market in
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING-A
SURVEY OF POSSIBLE BASES FOR LEGAL ATTACK UPON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND SEGRE-
GATION IN HOUSING, PROVIDED, AIDED, OR SUPPORTED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTION
(unpublished study in New York offices of NAACP, April 17, 1953). For indication
of the discriminatory policies of private builders in the Queens, Nassau and Suffolk County
areas in New York, see communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Hugo R. Hey-
dorn, real estate broker in Jamaica, New York, dated April 23, 1953, in Yale Law
Library.
Before Shelley v. Kraemer, restrictive covenants were very often imposed on properties
by the original builder. Comment, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 430
(1948).
84. Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See
Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372 (1953).
85. See MAISEL, HOUSEBUILDING IN TRANSITION 99 (1953); HOUSING AND HOME
FINANCE AGENCY, FINANCING HOUSE CONSTRUCTION IN THE NORTHWEST 33 (1951).
86. MAISEL, op. cit. supra note 85.
87. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, op. cit. supra note 85.
88. See notes 5 and 6 .supra and accompanying text.
89. "During the last decade, some of the large operative builders have set up their
own sales organizations, with salesmen paid on a salary basis or receiving a fixed
fee.... ." COLEAN, AMERICAN HOUSING 222 (1944).
90. This would appear to be the case where the builder and purchaser have clearly
entered into agreements not to sell to Negroes.
91. See COLEAN, AMERICAN HOUSING 217-21 (1944).
92. Id. at. 208.
93. The refusal of real estate brokers to admit Negroes into white neighborhoods
has been described as almost universal in both northern and southern urban centers
with large Negro populations. LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY 57 (1947). At
times brokers will discourage lending institutions from granting mortgages to Negroes
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which they operate.94 Furthermore, evidentiary factors supporting an allega-
tion of conspiracy may be found in past policy formulations of real estate
boards. Before Shelley v. Kraemer," the Code of Ethics of the National Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Boards 01 called for the preservation of existing racial
patterns in each neighborhoodY7 The Code is part of the regulations of every
member board.9 s Although this provision has since been stricken from the
Code, 99 it may serve to highlight the original purpose of a continuing
conspiracy.' 00
In some areas an express conspiracy on the part of real estate brokers can
probably be made out. There is evidence that real estate boards and their
member brokers have taken a lead in organizing restricted neighborhouds.'11
on properties bought in white neighborhoods. "WE'amn, THE NXFno GnETI 215 (1948).
For a comprehensive survey of the restrictive practices of brokers, see LONG6 & Jonr.Fo.*,
PEOPLE vs. PROPERTy 56-72 (1947). See also, WEWER, THu NErao Gnurro 215-17
(1948) ; NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISQRY Cou.-cI., EnuiT,%rTn or Opl'.-
TUITY IN HOUSIxG 15-17 (1952).
94. Brokers have made wide use of the "multiple listing system" in selling homes.
Local real estate boards establish bureaus with which member brokers may file listings
of all the homes they have been asked to sell; in exchange, they obtain the listings of all
other participating members. When a broker sells a home originally placed with another,
he gives the latter a percentage of the sales commission. McMicHAEi., SULING RrAL
ESTATE 86 (1940). Often, the seller will make use of an "open listing:" whereby a numb2r
of brokers are simultaneously employed. The commission goes to the one making the sale.
Wm-ER & Hovr, PRlCrPLES OF URBAN REAL EsrATE 26 (1939). Even in instanccs
where neither of these listing systems is employed, it is the business of the bro!er
thoroughly to familiarize himself with sales factors in his neighborhood. See Mc.Micn,-L,
op. cit. supra at 85, 432.
95. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
96. This organization consists of more than 4(0 member boards and 15,W0i) individual
members. It is the central control body in the real estate field and sets basic policy for all
its members. LONG & JOHNSON, PEoPLE vs. PaozmERT 57-S (1947).
97. See the provisions of the Code set out in WE.WER, THE NEro GnErro 217
(1948). A 1943 publication of the National Association cautioned member bro!:ers
against the following: "The prospective buyer might be a bootlegger who would cause
considerable annoyance to his neighbors, a madam who has a number of Call Girls on her
string, a gangster who want a screen for his activities by living in a better neighborhood,
a colored man of means who was giving his children a college education and thought they
were entitled to live among whites .... No matter what the motive or character of the
would-be purchaser, if the deal would instigate a form of blight, then certainly the well-
meaning broker must work against its consummation." Quoted in NATION.AL CoMMlIUNITY
RELATIONS ADVISORY CovxcI, EeuALrY OF OPPowRTuNITY L HousING 15-16 (1952).
98. WEAvER, THE NEGRO GH~rro 217 (1943).
99. The deletion of the provision, however, did not cause the abandonment of restric-
tive practices. See Communication to the YALE L.iw JOURNAL from Robert C. Weaver,
author of THE NFGRo GHSvro, dated March 15, 1954, in Yale Law Library; Ming,
Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenhl Amcndnent: the Restrictiv Covenant Cases, 16
U. OF CH. L REv. 203, 228 (1949).
100. See Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 6 3, 704-5 (1943).
101. See LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERY 67-9 (1947); FO. srL & Es-rax,
THE TROUBLE-MAKERS 261 (1952); Note, 37 CAL. L REv. 493 (1949).
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Agreements not to sell to Negroes have been exacted from neighborhood
home owners, 10 2 and in at least one area maps were drawn tip by the local
boards dividing the area into restricted and unrestricted sections. 103
Home Owners. Although Shelley prohibited judicial enforcement of re-
strictive covenants, it is probable that home owners have cpontinued the use of
this device to exclude Negroes from their neighborhoods. 0 4 Such agreements
have been entered into and privately enforced by formal groups known as
neighborhood improvement associations. 10 5 Although organized for diverse
purposes, a primary function of such an association in numerous instances is
to perpetuate the existing racial makeup of a neighborhood. 100 In addition
to the use of covenants, various other methods are employed to exclude
Negroes. 1 7 These more overt exclusionary practices can readily form the
basis for a finding of combined action.
The Restraint
A boycott of the Negro purchaser is involved here. 0 8 The principal argu-
ment that would probably be used to justify this restraint is that the admission
of Negroes into a neighborhood will diminish the property value of homes
102. See sources cited note 101 supra. The Urban League of Cleveland reports that
"there have been instances where pressure was brought to bear [by realtors] on indi-
vidual home owners who did attempt to sell [to Negroes]." Communication to the YALE
LAW JOURNAL from Arnold B. Walker, Executive Secretary of the Urban League of
Cleveland, dated March 24, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
103. LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY 60-1 (1947).
104. See Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Frances Levenson, Research
Director, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, dated May 27, 1954,
in Yale Law Library.
105. For a detailed study of the activities of these groups, see LoN & JOHNSON,
PEOPLE vs. PROPERTY 39-55 (1947). An ihdication of the importance of the associations
can be gathered from their size. In Chicago, for example, they have a combined member-
ship of 15,529, the medium size being 266; in Detroit there are 6,210 members, with a
median size of 333. Id. at 42-3.
106. Id. at 40.
107. Their activities include: meetings at which common policies are adopted; the
formation of home owner "clubs" whose officers must approve all new purchasers in the
area; the use of the Van Sweringen Covenant (in Cleveland) requiring that the original
owner approve the sale of a home; placing title to the land in a central body which then
determines to whom it will lease if the present occupier decides to move; and even overt
intimidation and violence. See, generally, LONG & JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PRoI'ERTv 39-55,
73-7 (1947); FORsTR & EPSTIN, THE TROUBLE-MAERes 258-60 (1952); WEAVER, Tn
NoGRo GHETro 240-1, 249-53 (1948) ; NATIONCAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUN-
CIL, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 12-15 (1952) ; Marcus, Civil Rights and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. OF Cxi. L. REv. 171, 209-10, 212 (1951); Ming, Racial Restric-
tions on the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. or Cut.
L. REv. 203, 216-26 (1949) ; Note, 37 CAL. L. REv. 493 (1949). For discussion of the Van
Sweringen covenants, see NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL, op. Cit.
supra at 12-3; Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Arnold B. Walker, Executive
Secretary of the Urban League of Cleveland, dated March 24, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
108. See note 34 supra.
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there. But such an assertion is basically unsound ;103 in those cases where
property values do decline initially, there is substantial authority to the effect
that this is only the result of the panic of the whites in the neighborhood. 11
And this panic effect is often started or aided by real estate operators who
hope to buy cheaply and then resell to Negroes at a substantial profit.l
M1oreover, this is not the kind of defense which will justify a boycott even
under the "rule of reason."112
Interstate Commerce
The sale of a house seldom involves an interstate transaction." 5 But the
purchase of almost all newly-constructed homes is financed by murt ,age
loans,114 and most transfers of existing homes, are similarly backed by
mortgages. 115 Thus, such sales are usually dependent upon and directly affect
other transactions, interstate in nature. The Sherman Act does not require
that a particular activity be in interstate commerce in order to come within
its scope; it is enough that it affects such commerce."10
The restraint is not as directly related to interstate commerce here as it
is in refusal to lend situations. Cases have held that the effect on such corn-
merce may be too "remote," "insubstantial," "indirect," or "fortuitous" to
violate § 1. Many of these have been labor cases, however, where a policy of
109. See note 39 supra, and accompanying text.
110. Ibid.
111. See W EVEr, THE NEcRo Ganrro 272-3 (194); NATIONAL Co,mu:n" Ru-,-
TioNs A.visory CoUNcIL, op. cit. supra note 106, at 16-17; Velie, Hosinq: Detroit's Tin:
Bomb, Collier's, Nov. 23, 1946, p. 76, col. 4. The real estate orerator, as distinguhcd
from the broker, buys and then himself resells homes. CoLN, A'EucA.z HousI:G 221
(1944).
See also communication to Yale Law Journal from Bernard G. Walpin, real e tate
broker and attorney in Forest Hills, New York, dated June 7, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
Mr. W1alpin states that the real estate broker too will often profit by the difficulties the
Negro faces in gaining entry into a white area. If he decides to place a Negro in a
changing neighborhood, he will frequently secure a larger commission than normally.
112. See notes 40-2 supra, and accompanying text.
113. See CoLEx-n, A:Erciu HoUsING 179-SO (1944).
114. A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of 15 metropolitan areas shows that fir
July-December 1949 at least 91% of the purchases of new hones were bached by mrrt-
gages in all but one of the areas. In the latter area, Seattle, 871C of such purchas!es were
mortgage financed. New Home Financing and Charactcristics in 15 Metropolitat; Arces,
Construction (joint publication of the Department of Labor and Bureau of Labvr Sta-
tistics) Feb. 1951, p. 26, table 17.
115. See Communication to YALE LAw JuTN~AL from Henry D. Schechter, financal
economist of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, dated May 12, 1954, in Yale Law"
Library.
116. See note 53 supra. In those areas in which a buyer's market e:ists, the re-
quirement may be met by showing the effect of refusals to sell on the interstate flow of
building materials. This would be the case where an agreenLit butv.cn an opvratve
builder and prior purchasers prevents the former fromn building and selling to egr s
and whites in greater volume than to whites alone.
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judicial forbearance exists." 7 Other decisions are in conflict with broader
interpretations of the Act;118 and the liberal constructions are dominant
today."n
117. "[W]e have two declared Congressional policies which it is our responsibility
to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competetive business economy; the other
to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency
of collective bargaining.... Thus, these Congressionally permitted union activities may
restrain trade in and of themselves. There is no denying the fact that many of them
do so, both directly and indirectly. Congress evidently concluded, however, that the chief
objective of Anti-trust legislation, preservation of business competition, could be accom-
plished by applying the legislation primarily only to those business groups which are
directly interested in destroying competition." Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806, 811 (1945). A
similar policy prevails as to legitimate labor activities of employers. See United States
v. Detroit Sheet Metal and Roofing Contractors Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 81, 90 (E.D. Mich.
1953); United States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 57 F. Supp. 57, 62
(N.D. Cal. 1944). Combinations between unions and non-labor groups, however, have
been condemned. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, supra; United States v. New York Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 42
F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
In dealing with labor cases courts have looked primarily to the nature of the restraint.
If legitimate employer or employee activities are involved, any interference with the free
flow of interstate commerce has been held only remote or incidental to the prinary
purpose of the activities. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). In
discussing an earlier labor case, the Court said, "It was thus made apparent that in
saying that 'indirect obstructions' to commerce were not condemned by the Sherman Act
where the conspiracy is not directed at that commerce, the Court was not seeking to
apply a purely mechanical test of liability, but was using a shorthand expression to signify
that the Sherman Act was directed only at those restraints whose evil consequences are
derived from the suppression of competition in the interstate market, so as to monopolize
the supply, control its price or discriminate between its would-be purchasers.' And in
speaking of intent as a prerequisite to liability under the Act where the restraint to
interstate commerce is 'indirect' it meant no more than that the conspiracy or combination
must be directed at the kind of restraint which the Act prohibits or that such restraint is
the natural and probable consequences of the conspiracy." Id. at 511.
Labor cases in which the courts have not found the requisite burden on interstate
commerce include Levering and Garrigues v. Norrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Industrial
Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925) ; United Leather Workers
v. Herkert, 265 U.S. 457 (1924) ; United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd sub nora." United States v. Int'l Hod Carriers & Common Laborers' District Coun-
cil, 313 U.S. 539 (1941); Consolidated Terminal Corp. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs and
Helpers Local Union, 33 F. Supp. 645 (D.D.C. 1940); United States v. Needle
Trades Workers Industrial Union, 10 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). Cf. Fehr Baking
Co. v. Bakers' Union, 20 F. Supp. 691, 697 (W.D. La. 1937). The first three cases, often
cited by counsel contending that a particular restraint exerts only an indirect effect on
interstate commerce, are distinguished in United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324
U.S. 293, 297 (1945) and United States v. Detroit Sheet Metal and Roofing Ass'n, 116
F. Supp. 81, 90 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
118. Compare United States v. Greater Kansas City Chapter, National Electrical
Contractors Ass'n, 82 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Mo. 1949) and United States v. San Francisco
Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 57 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Cal. 1944), with United States v.
Northeast Texas Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 181 F.2d 30, 33-4
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Even in those areas where most mortgage financing is intrastate, case law
indicates that the interstate commerce requirement may be satisfied. For the
(5th Cir. 1950), United States v. Minneapolis Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 99 F. Supp.
75 (D. Minn. 1951), and United States v. New York Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 42 F.
Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); also compare United States v. French Bauer, 48 F. Supp.
260 (S.D. Ohio 1942), uith Universal Milk Bottle Service v. United States, 1SS F.2d 959
(6th Cir. 1951) and United States v. Sheffield Farms Co., 43 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
also compare Albrecht v. Kinsella, 119 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1941), uilh United States v.
Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
119. In tracing the development of the commerce clause, the Supreme Court has
given as specific a statement as possible of the present-day status of that clause as regards
the Sherman Act: "In view of this evolution, the inquiry whether the restraint occurs
in one phase or another, interstate or intrastate, of the total economic process is now
merely a preliminary step, except for those situations in which no aspect of or sub-
stantial effect upon interstate commerce can be found in the sum of the facts presented.
For, given a restraint of the type forbidden by the Act, though arising in the course of
intrastate or local activities, and a showing of actual or threatened effect upon interstate
commerce, the vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and ad-
verse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the Act's terms to constitute a forbidden
consequence." Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
234 (1948).
The Supreme Court has held the effect on interstate commerce to be too insubstantial
or too remote in only two modem cases; and in both the failure to affect such commerce
was dearly evident. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326
(1952) (defendants, charged with monpolizing and restraining the business of prepaid
medical care in Oregon, "made a number of payments to out-of-state doctors and hos-
pitals, presumably for treatment of policy holders who happened to remove or temporarily
to be away from Oregon when need for service arose"); United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (cab passengers, transported from their homes or offices to
railroad stations where they embarked on interstate journeys).
For modem cases in which the courts have found local activities to be part of a continuous
flow of interstate commerce or to affect such commerce, see Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314-5 (1949); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v.
United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing
Photo-Engravers Ass'n of Philadelphia, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v.
Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California, 43 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1942),
aff'd, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F2d
376, 401-2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) ; United States v. Detroit Sheet
Metal and Roofing Contractors Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1953) ; United States
v. Greater Kansas City Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 85 F. Supp. 503, 510 (W.D. Me.
1949) ; United States v. National Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 448 (D. Colo.
1941); United States v. Mountain States Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 4(0 (D.
Colo. 1941); United States v. Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contractors Ass'n of
Southern California, 33 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Fehr Baking Co. v. Bakers'
Union, 20 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. La. 1937). See also United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
324 U.S. 293 (1945), and cases cited notes 53 and 118 supra. But ef. the following
modern cases in which the courts held that only local activities were involved: Spears
Free Clinic & Hospital for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952);
Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, ISO F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950); Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola
Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946); Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F2d 2,
823-4 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Abouaf v. J.D. & A.B. Spreckels Co.,
26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939). See also cases cited note 118 sipra.
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anmount of interstate commerce affected by a particular restraint has been held
to be of little consequence.1 20
TnE REMEDIES
An action under the Sherman Act may be instituted by either the federal
government or a private party. Section 4 authorizes United States district
attorneys to institute equity proceedings to "restrain and prevent" violations
of the Act.1 2 1 Suit by a private party may be for similar injunctive relief 122
or for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act.128
Possible damage actions may be for increased rental or sales prices.'2 4
Precise proof of damages is not necessary. In Bigelow v. RKO 125 a motion
picture theatre owner was granted treble damages against a number of film
distributors and exhibitors which had refused to lease him first-run features.
The Supreme Court held that a jury may estimate probable damages where
defendants' tortious acts precluded more precise ascertainment. 120
One of the methods of proving damages accepted in Bigelow was a compari-
son of plaintiff's earnings over a five year period with those of a comparable
theatre of defendants.' 27 Thus, it would seem that private parties in a housing
segregation case could introduce evidence of the differences in rental and sales
prices between comparable white and Negro dwellings.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, individual complainants may
join in a common suit. Rule 20 provides for permissive joinder of plaintiffs
whose right to relief arises out of the same "transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences."'12 More applicable to housing segregation,
however, may be Rule 23(a). This permits actions by one or more members
of a particular class on behalf of the others, where they are "so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court."' 2 9 Thus, repre-
120. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947); Apex Hosiery
Company v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 485 (1940) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
121. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1946).
122. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1946).
123. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946). Recovery for costs and for a reason-
able attorney's fee is also authorized.
124. See note 33 supra.
125. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
126. "The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created."
Bigelow v. RKO, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). See also Loew's v. Cinema Amusements,
210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1954).
127. Bigelow v. RKO, 327 U.S. 251, 257-8 (1946). See also Loew's v. Cinema
Amusements, 210 F.2d 86, 91-2 (10th Cir. 1954).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 20. See, generally, Comment, Antitrust Enforccnent By Private
Parties, 61 YAIE L.J. 1010, 1036-7 (1952).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Both Rules 20 and 23(a) require that a common ques-
tion of law or fact exist. See, generally, Comment, Antitrust Enforccnenut By Private
Parties, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1036-7 (1952).
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sentatives of all Negroes who have been harmed by restrictive practices in a
particular area could bring damage actions in the name of all.
CONCLUSION
The Sherman Act cannot be invoked to attack housing segregation where-
ever it exists. In many fact situations all the statutory requirements cannot
be met. It appears likely, however, that they can be satisfied in numerous areas
in which restrictive practices have been adopted.
It seems highly desirable to attempt to employ the Sherman Act in this
field. The elimination of restrictive practices on the part of private parties
will serve to further the meritorious approach adopted in Shelley v.
Kraemer.'"0 More effective competition will be brought to the housing market,
and the Negro will no longer be forced to content himself with the "left-overs"
of so vital an incident to individual well-being.
130. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also the recent Supreme Court
decision barring segregation in the public school systems. Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 74 Sup. Ct. 686 (1954).
